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WILL BIG THREE RECONCILE FUNDAMENTAL AIMS AT POTSDAM?

THE lack of information about other than social activities at the Potsdam conference has brought understandable complaints from newspaper reporters gathered in Berlin for this occasion—understandable because the task of reporters is to obtain news. Yet it is difficult to see how problems of the magnitude and delicacy of those being discussed by the Big Three could be satisfactorily considered in the full glare of daily publicity without arousing premature and perhaps destructive controversy. We do not expect business executives, or labor leaders, or heads of educational institutions, to transact their affairs or settle their conflicts at press conferences or before microphones. Why should we expect this of political leaders and diplomats? What is important is not that negotiations should be carried on in public, but that the results of these negotiations should be communicated frankly and promptly to the peoples of the world, for their discussion and criticism.

RESPONSIBLE PRESS ESSENTIAL. With time, as we all become more accustomed to working together in international agencies, and as all the United Nations, we must hope, achieve the degree of freedom of discussion and freedom of the press existing in Western Europe, Britain, the United States, and the Dominions, it will become possible to discuss openly an increasingly wider area of problems affecting all nations. But this objective can be ultimately attained only if a high degree of responsibility in presenting and analyzing the news is maintained by the press of the world. At San Francisco, for example, there was a disturbing tendency on the part of even seasoned commentators to fall prey, all too easily, to moods of depression about the prospects of the conference, to criticize this or that nation, to exaggerate controversial issues, often without sufficient appreciation of the historic background of the problems under discussion, the motives of the

persons involved, and the possible basis for compromise between conflicting views. Too many reporters still look on discussions among nations as if they were sport events, asking all the time "who won?"—not, as they should, "what chance is there for agreement?"

PEACE MAIN GOAL OF U.S. The chief concern of the United States at this moment is to see to it that the adjustments which must be made if the military victories of the United Nations are to be translated into peacetime collaboration are apportioned more or less equally among the Big Three. This is a natural concern, and President Truman expressed it well in his brief speech of July 20 in Berlin when he said: "Let us not forget that we are fighting for peace and for the welfare of mankind. We are not fighting for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of a monetary nature that we want out of this war. We want peace and prosperity for the world as a whole."

There is an inevitable tendency on our part to feel that this country is bearing a large share of the burdens of the war, especially now in the Pacific, and to fear that our partners in the Big Three, Britain or Russia, will ask for more than we think is their due in terms of power and, at the same time, may act in their relations with other peoples in a way which would not win public approval here. It would be dangerous, however, to foster the impression that we alone are virtuous, while others are either actually or potentially wicked. True, we have no territorial or financial designs on Europe, or Africa, or the Near and Middle East where the security interests of Britain or Russia or both are more directly at stake than our own. But territorial and financial aspirations are not the only national aspirations that can disturb other nations. When the British or Russians hear Americans insisting on a dominant

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position with respect to civil aviation, merchant shipping, special trade advantages, access to oil in this or that area, and control of islands in the Pacific regarded as necessary for this country's security, they feel they are justified in making comparable claims, or in retaining comparable factors of power they already possess.

BIG THREE AT WORK ON BALANCE SHEET.

Each of the Big Three at Potsdam has something to gain, and each looks to its partners to compensate it for such concessions as it is asked to make on some points by concession on others. The United States wants two things above all: termination of the war in the Pacific at the earliest possible moment by a decisive victory over Japan, and stabilization of Europe and Asia to an extent that will make it possible for the world to look forward, as President Truman said, "to the greatest age in the history of mankind." The aid of Britain and Russia is essential for the achievement of both objectives: for it is clear that, while we and the British are inflicting defeats on Japan at sea and in the air, we shall need Russia's land forces to oust the Japanese from the mainland of China; and unless an agreement can be reached between the Big Three concerning a joint policy with respect not only to Germany, but also to the liberated countries, Europe could remain a seething cauldron for years to come. Britain, like the United States, wants termination of the war in the Pacific, so that it can turn to the urgent tasks of domestic reconstruction—a reconstruction which is an essential preliminary to even partial recovery of Britain's role in world trade and finance; and, like the United States, Britain seeks peace and stability in Europe, having learned at the cost of two bitter wars that conflict on the continent will sooner or later engulf the British Isles. Whatever else may be said of Russia's plans in Europe and Asia, the Soviet government, too, needs a long period of peace during which it can proceed with the reconstruction of the country's devastated areas, and the creation of a peacetime industry that could supply at least the minimum consumers' re-

quirements of the Russian people.

From the point of view of some Americans and Britishers, the pacification of Europe is threatened by Russia's attempt to foster the establishment, in countries along its western border, of governments it describes as "friendly." The Western powers are consequently pressing for the holding of what would be regarded by their standards as "free, unfettered elections" to determine the will of the peoples in these countries, and for the admission of newspaper correspondents who could accurately inform Britain and the United States concerning the situation in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, areas which Russia regards as essential for its security. From the point of view of the Russians, the pacification of Europe is threatened by the continued existence of régimes like that of Franco in Spain, and the non-removal, or return to power, in some of the countries of western Europe of individuals or groups whom they describe as "Fascist." Similarly, in Asia, some Americans and Britishers regard the Chinese Communists as an obstacle to the unification of China, which is essential for the successful prosecution of the war and the future stabilization of Asia, while the Russians see certain elements in the Chungking government of Chiang Kai-shek as inimical to such unification.

When all is said and done, it is not the territorial, or financial, or trade issues that present the greatest difficulties at Potsdam. The most difficult issue is that of bringing to a conclusion the unfinished war that has been raging since the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917 concerning the political, social and economic shape the modern world is to take. It is as if continuous communication had to be established between two hitherto closed vessels of water, until the water in the two vessels can reach the same level. The problem is not insoluble, but it calls for more than territorial or financial adjustments. It calls for mental and emotional adjustments on the part of both of the Western powers, and of Russia.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

FRANCO BENEFITS BY LACK OF UNITED OPPOSITION

Since V-E Day, when General Francisco Franco lost his Axis support, the Caudillo has made repeated efforts to present to the world the picture of a reformed Spain, in the hope of improving his country's relations with the Allies. Highlights of Franco's recent attempts along these lines have been the termination of diplomatic relations with Japan on April 12, and the conclusion of two air agreements with the United States which concede transit rights to United States airlines reaching Spain and give the Air Transport Command permission to construct an airport for Allied occupation and relief supplies at Barajas, outside Madrid, which some Spaniards caus-

tically label the American Gibraltar. In addition, Franco has made some moves toward easing present political restrictions within Spain. If the new "Bill of Rights," approved on July 13, is typical of these reforms, however, these measures seem instead to consolidate the autocratic power of the State, while setting certain limitations on its application which can be lifted at will. The conclusion is inescapable that Franco's "reform" program—including the waiver of political and civil charges resulting from the civil war, the restoration of some civil liberties and freedom of the press, the promise of municipal and provincial elections, and so forth—is a temporary

attempt to assuage public opinion within and outside Spain rather than a genuine effort to liberalize the régime.

NEW FALANGE RESHUFFLE. That the recent concessions do little to fulfil popular demand is nowhere more apparent than in the recent cabinet changes. As the date of the ninth anniversary of the Franco régime drew near, it was widely believed that General Franco would take this occasion to eliminate some of the party's influence in the government. It was thought that the régime could not possibly survive the Axis downfall, especially after the United Nations at San Francisco had barred the Franco government, as Axis-supported, from joining the world security organization. In his July 17 speech, the Spanish leader, however, unexpectedly stated his intention of eventually restoring the "traditional Spanish monarchy" and reaffirmed the position of the Falange movement.

The new cabinet, which supposedly will function in the period leading up to the re-establishment of the monarchy, is still predominantly Falangist in composition. On the other hand, although five supposedly monarchist sympathizers were appointed to cabinet positions, none of them is said to have the support either of Don Juan, the heir-presumptive, or of any other monarchist groups. In short, the cabinet changes appear intended to remove notoriously pro-German Falangists, on the one hand, and to concede some participation in the government to representatives of the strongest conservative groups in divided Spain, on the other hand.

If the Caudillo is indeed giving serious thought to the feasibility of establishing a royal successor, the monarchy would be only a puppet régime, with the Falange manipulating the strings. Speculation regarding a possible figurehead for such a régime is fruitless. Except in the case of Don Juan—third son of King Alfonso XIII who renounced the throne in 1931—widely regarded as the legitimate pretender, the claims of other aspirants to the throne are

hopelessly involved. Don Juan himself on March 23 issued a manifesto disapproving Franco's internal and foreign policies and calling on him to relinquish power in favor of constitutional monarchy.

FRANCO'S POWERS OF SURVIVAL. If Franco is strong today, his strength lies mainly in the division among his opponents, both those who remained in Spain and those who live in exile. Only a few months ago, dissident Spaniards believed that the Generalissimo, with or without the Falange, could not outlast an Axis defeat, and that the transition to representative government could even be effected without further civil war. Now it appears that the alternative to his going may be a recurrence of that internecine strife which has so tragically punctuated the past century of Spanish history. The present régime is well aware that the exiled leaders of the Left have been no more able to compose their differences than they were during the period of the belligerent Republican Government. It would not be surprising if, during their long period of exile, the former leaders find that, in their concern over the formalist structure of the government-in-exile, they have drifted away from their supporters in Spain. Added to this dispersion of leadership is the separatist tendency of the Catalan and Basque states which, however well-founded, further complicates the task of achieving unity within the opposition.

Abroad, too, Franco's position does not seem to have been undermined by the end of the European war. Although the United States and Britain have urged the Spanish leader to adopt more liberal domestic policies, neither of the great powers appears inclined to force the issue of Franco's future status. It has been Britain's traditional policy to cultivate Spain, which lies athwart the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean, and its need for Spanish iron ore has strengthened this close relationship. While United States trade with Spain is of little significance, this country is interested in Spain as an important entry point for its burgeoning air traffic with Europe and, in general, seems willing to follow British policy with regard to that country. As its vote at San Francisco on the question of Spain's admission to the United Nations demonstrated, the United States does not approve of Franco's foreign policy; yet it considers that the question whether Franco is to stay or go is purely a domestic problem, to be decided by the Spanish people themselves, with the least possible amount of civil disorder.

OLIVE HOLMES

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by Vera Micheles Dean

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
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Washington News Letter



UNRRA CRISIS REVEALS NEED TO UNIFY RELIEF AGENCIES

Confronted with the possibility of widespread starvation in Europe during the coming winter, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration at this critical moment lacks the money, supplies and authority it requires in order to give relief to the war-battered populations of Europe. Shipping is now available, but UNRRA more than once has been unable to obtain the goods needed to fill the holds of vessels bound for the eastern European area, where it is directly responsible for relief. A well-intentioned regulation which provides that UNRRA should hand over the distribution of supplies to local political agencies has resulted, in Greece at least, in distribution based on favoritism rather than need. Moreover, UNRRA has no food resources of its own. It can only beg its member countries to contribute the commodities for which Europe is calling. As a result, the problem of relief needs abroad is certain to confront Americans with a difficult decision. UNRRA Director General Herbert H. Lehman, speaking in Rome on July 10, suggested that full satisfaction of the relief program "may cause tightening of belts in the United States," but on the same day the new Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton P. Anderson, said that the United States cannot feed the world.

CONFUSION OF RELIEF AGENCIES. At the present time UNRRA competes for materials with two other agencies that are providing relief abroad—the Army and the Foreign Economic Administration. UNRRA has relief jurisdiction over only six southern and Eastern European countries—Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and Poland. FEA, through lend-lease, is supplying relief to Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Australia and China, while the Army Civil Affairs Division has charge of relief in Germany, Austria and the United States operational areas in the Far East. A vital need is centralization of relief work either by some sort of consolidation of the three undertakings, as suggested by Representative Everett M. Dirksen, Republican of Illinois, in hearings of the House Appropriations Committee on June 14; or by the creation of a super-relief council that can give authoritative orders to governments to cooperate with UNRRA on a broader scale than present standards make possible, as suggested by Sir Arthur Salter, former UNRRA deputy director, in a letter to the London *Times* on April 16.

The appropriations assigned to UNRRA are small compared with the amounts allotted the lend-lease relief programs. Its authorized budget is \$2,500,000,000, a sum it has not yet received in full. The United States is pledged to contribute more than any other single country—\$1,350,000,000, of which \$793,000,000 has been made available—as compared with relief estimates totaling \$913,000,000 for the six countries of eastern and southeastern Europe for the second half of 1945. In addition, UNRRA has the costly tasks of caring for and directing homeward-displaced persons in Europe, and of operating refugee camps in North Africa.

By contrast, FEA during the fiscal year that began on July 1 plans to lend-lease \$750,000,000 worth of food for Britain and \$500,000,000 for the Soviet Union (Asiatic areas), as well as funds for liberated western European countries and areas of the Pacific. The needs of western Europe are obviously great. British rations have gone down since V-E Day, and the London housewife can now obtain only one ounce of fat a week for frying purposes. The caloric consumption in France today is but 2,150, Belgium 1,795, Holland 1,650, and Norway 1,115. Meanwhile, severe droughts have seriously reduced wheat supplies in French North Africa, and especially in Australia. Nor is food the only relief problem in Europe, ranking in order of gravity behind coal, transportation, housing and communications.

UNRRA LONDON CONFERENCE. The world will have an opportunity to reconsider the whole problem of relief in August, when UNRRA holds its third general conference in London; the first was in Atlantic City in November 1943 and the second in Montreal in September 1944. To any suggestion made in London for consolidation of relief, the objection may be raised that the functions of UNRRA, lend-lease and the Army are distinct—that the first distributes relief gifts to countries unable to finance their own program, the second supports countries where civil order is necessary for American re-deployment and which are assisting, or will assist, us in the Pacific, and the third is administering a bare subsistence program as an integral part of military operations, either combat or occupation. Yet in essence all three perform the same task. All three feed, clothe and medicate men, women and children. They can do it better in unity than in competition.

BLAIR BOLLES

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